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NOTES AND COMMENTS
restriction on the extent to which section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley
Act confers federal jurisdiction. Legislative history does not indicate
that such a distinction was intended. Further, this distinction was the
result of the Courts wanting to avoid constitutional issues which have
now been resolved. Be this as it may, when this distinction is applied
to the arbitration situation, the courts should find that there is a "unique-
ly personal" right of the employee only after there has been submission
to arbitration and compliance with the award of the arbitrator. The
result of the Kornman case seems preferable to that of the Cone Mills
case.
JAMES W. KIRKPATRICK, JR.
Labor Law-FLSA-Extending "In Commerce" Coverage
In Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaghy & Associates,' the respondent was
an architectural and consulting engineering firm engaged in the prepara-
tion of plans and specifications for repair and construction of various in-
terstate facilities, including air bases, roads, turnpikes, bus terminals,
and radio and television installations. Also, it was engaged in the prep-
aration of plans for the construction of homes, shopping centers, and
commercial buildings. These plans and specifications consist of draw-
ings and information needed for the estimation of cost and guidance to
contractors in their bidding and in actual construction. The information
is gathered by fieldmen at the sites of the projects and transmitted to
the offices of the respondent. From this information draftsmen prepare
the plans under the supervision of professional engineers. In addition
to the draftsmen, clerks and stenographers also participate in the me-
chanical process of preparing the plans.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit2 held that the
draftsmen, fieldmen, clerks, and stenographers, as a group, were neither
"engaged in the production of goods for commerce" nor, because of the
local nature of the business, "engaged in commerce" so as to come within
the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.3 Under an almost
identical set of facts the Eighth Circuit in Mitchell v. Brown4 had held
that the employer's draftsmen, fieldmen, clerks, and stenographers, as a
group, were "engaged in commerce" and thus covered by the act. It was
1358 U.S. 207 (1959).
'250 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1957).
'Fair Labor Standards Act § 6(a), 52 STAr. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 206(a) (1958):
"Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who is engaged in com-
merce or in the production of goods for commerce wages at the following
rate. . ."
'244 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955). Apparently
the only factual difference in the two cases was that in the Brown case an agent
of the defendant inspected the work of the contractor.
1959]
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because of this apparent conflict of circuits that the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
The Court confined itself to the issue of whether the employees were
"engaged in commerce" and did not go into the question of whether or
not they were "engaged in the production of goods for commerce."
Whether an employee is covered by the Act is determined by his activity
and not by the nature of the business of the employer.5 The question
was whether the activities of the employees in the Lublin and Brown
cases were of a sort that facilitated the operation of instrumentalities of
commerce. The Court deemed the employees to be "so closely related
to commerce as to be a part of it," in the language of McLeod v.
Threlkeld,6 and concluded that they were covered.
The court of appeals in the Lublin case had found the employer's
business to be of a local nature, thereby giving color to the activities of
the subordinates, the draftsmen, fieldmen, clerks and stenographers and
had said that the court in the Brown case had ignored this element.
The Brown court had considered the work of these same employee cate-
gories to be not "isolated local activity" but "directly and vitally re-
lated' 7 to interstate commerce. The fact that an agent of the employer
was materially aiding the employer's clients by checking materials and
workmanship of the contractor on interstate jobs was afforded consid-
erable weight. These two cases point up the difficulty of determining
coverage in the fringe area of the "engaged in commerce" clause.
Early cases8 held that employees who operated facilities of interstate
commerce were covered by FLSA. In Overstreet v. North Shore Corp.,9
coverage was extended to include employees who maintained and re-
paired a toll road and draw bridge that connected with an interstate
highway. The maintenance and repair of a facility of interstate com-
merce was deemed to be so closely related to such commerce as to be
a part of it. In J. F. Fitzgerald Constr. Co. v. Pedersen,'0 it was held
that employees of an independent contractor who helped repair and
replace washed out bridge abutments for a railroad were "engaged in
commerce" and cited as authority the Overstreet case. Thus Fitzgerald
'McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491 (1943) ; A. B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling,
316 U.S. 517 (1942).
' Supra note 5. In a five to four decision the Court held that a cook hired by
an independent contractor to move with and feed the maintenance gang of a rail-
road was not covered. The dissent in McLeod put up a vigorous protest that
commerce covers a whole field of which transportation is only a part and felt that
to hold the cook not covered was to construe the "engaged in commerce" clause too
narrowly.
7 224 F.2d at 363.
,Culkin v. Glenn L. Martin Neb. Co., 97 F. Supp. 661 (D.C. Neb. 1951),
aff'd, 197 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 866 (1952), rehearing
denied, 344 U.S. 888 (1952); Torres v. American R. Co. of Puerto Rico, 66 F.
Supp. 745 (D.C. Puerto Rico 1946).
'318 U.S. 125 (1943). 10324 U.S. 720 (1945).
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extended coverage to the employees of independent contractors where
the work involves replacing or repairing the instrumentality of interstate
commerce.
11
A guidepost case in delineating the fringe area of coverage under
the "engaged in commerce" clause is McLeod. In that case coverage
was denied; however, under the "production of goods for commerce"
clause it has been held in a similar fact situation that the employee in
question was covered.' 2  A further study of the cases points up the
broader interpretation given to the "production of goods for commerce"
clause.13 And this is true despite the fact, pointed out by the McLeod
dissent, that the relevant tests for determining scope of coverage of the
two clauses in the act are cast in similar language. Thus under the
"production" clause, in Kirschbaum v. Walling, it is work which has
"such a close and immediate tie with the process of production for com-
merce as to be an essential part of it." Under the "in commerce" clause,
in Overstreet v. North Shore Corp. work that "is so intimately related
to interstate commerce as to be in practice and in legal contemplation a
part of it" brings the employee under coverage as "engaged in com-
merce."
In Mitchell v. C. W. Voll.mer & Co.,1 4 the court found the employees
covered under the "in commerce" clause where they were engaged in the
" But see Nieves v. Standard Dredging Corp., 152 F.2d 719 (1st Cir. 1945),
where a lapse in the general extension of coverage occurred with the "new con-
struction" theory. There, the employees were performing dredging operations for
a graving dock and entrance channel site where previously there had been a
swampy, uninhabited wilderness. The employees were held not covered because
their project had never been used as an instrumentality of interstate commerce and
thus they were deemed to be neither in commerce nor its movement so as to be a
part thereof. The original construction was felt to be of a local nature until it is
made a part of an instrumentality of interstate commerce.
" Consolidated Timber Co. v. Womack, 132 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1942) (Cook
who stayed with and fed a timber camp gang was covered because he was engaged
in a process or occupation necessary to the production of goods for commerce.)
But cf. Skidmore v. John J. Casale, Inc., 160 F.2d 527 (2nd Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 812 (1947), where it was held that the employee was not engaged in
commerce when he cared for washrooms and lockers in a garage which serviced
trucks used both in interstate and intrastate commerce.
"3 A. B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942) (Employees engaged
in the operation and maintenance of a loft building in which quantities of goods
were manufactured and sold in interstate commerce were held to have such a
"close and immediate tie with the process of production for commerce" as to be
regarded as "necessary to the production of commerce.") ; Borden Co. v. Borella,
325 U.S. 679 (1945) (Maintenance employees of an office building where only ad-
ministrative work was done by a firm, who owned the building but rented out part
of it, were covered because the work was necessary to production of goods for
commerce.). The Court said it did not make a difference whether the goods are
actually produced in the building or production administered, managed, and con-
trolled in the building. But see 10 East 40th St. Bldg., Inc. v. Callus, 325 U.S.
578 (1945) (The maintenance employees of the owner of an office building which
rented office space to all comers were not covered because the renting of office space
was considered of a local nature.)
'349 U.S. 427 (1954).
19591
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construction of an alternate waterway to relieve congestion of an existing
interstate waterway. By finding that the construction of the alternate
waterway was in effect a redesigning of an existing facility of interstate
commerce, the court removed the local activity tag of new construction."5
The practical effect of this case, in the light of the cases previously dis-
cussed, was to enlarge the "engaged in commerce" clause.
The holding in the Lublin case has expanded the coverage of the
FLSA by further enlarging the scope of the "engaged in commerce" sec-
tion. The test used by the Court is the same one used in Mitchell v.
Vollner, namely "whether the work is so directly and vitally related to
the functioning of an instrumentality or facility of interstate commerce
so as to be, in practical effect, a part of it rather than isolated local
activity"16-practically the same test used in McLeod and Kirschbaun.
The Court of Appeals in Lublin also cited the Vollmer case, but
distinguished it on the grounds that the employees in Vollmer were
employees of the construction contractor, whereas the employees in
Lublin were employees of an architectural engineering contractor who
were more distantly removed from the interstate instrumentality.
In effect, the Supreme Court has ruled that it makes no difference who
the employer of the employees was in these two situations, and that the
nature of the work of the employees would bring them within the "en-
gaged in commerce" section in either case. The Supreme Court said:
[S]uch work is directly and vitally related to the functioning of
these facilities because, without the preparation of plans for
guidance, the construction could not be effected and the facilities
could not function as planned. In our modern, technologically
oriented society, the elements which combine to produce a final
product are diffuse and variegated. Deciding whether any one
element is so directly related to the end product as to be con-
sidered vital is sometimes a difficult problem. But plans, draw-
ings and specifications have taken on greater importance as the
complexities of design and bidding have increased. Under the
circumstances present here, we have no hesitancy in concluding
that the preparation of the plans and specifications was directly
related to the end products and that the employees whose activities
were intimately related to such preparation were 'engaged in com-
merce.
'17
The Lublin case would seem to be a new guidepost in the fringe area
of coverage under the "engaged in commerce" clause. The activities of
the draftsmen, fieldmen, clerks, and stenographers here are not such that
they directly facilitate the functioning of an interstate instrumentality by
doing the work that improves or maintains these instrumentalities. These
"5 See note 11 supra. 16 349 U.S. at 429.
17 358 U.S. at 212.
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employees work on the blueprints and drawings which are used by con-
tractors to improve such facilities of interstate commerce, one step re-
moved. The work of these employees is so directly and vitally related to
the functioning of a facility of interstate commerce, however, as to be, in
practical effect, a part of it rather than isolated local activity. The
clerks and stenographers were as much an aid in preparing the blue-
prints and drawings as were the fieldmen and draftsmen because all
were necessary for the final product.
While enlarging the "in commerce" section, the Court refused to
deal with the "production of goods" question presented to them by the
Fourth Circuit. From this refusal, a negative implication may be drawn
that the Court is restricting the "production of goods" section in con-
formity with the intentions of the 1949 Amendments.' 8
RiciHaD G. BADmEr
CoNNm E. BOLDEN
Railway Labor Act-Rights of Minority Groups to Membership in
Labor Union Acting as Statutory Bargaining Agent
Several Negro firemen employed by various southern railroads
brought a class action in federal court, seeking admission to member-
ship in the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, their
statutory bargaining representative under the Railway Labor Act. Negro
firemen are excluded from membership in the Brotherhood because its
constitution limits membership to applicants "white born." Held, that
the action be dismissed. The Brotherhood is a private association whose
membership policies are not subject to judicial control; the plaintiffs have
failed to show that an agency of the federal government is responsible
for their plight.'
The great majority of unions in this country do not practice racial
discrimination in membership. 2 At least thirty-nine union constitutions,
" These changed the words "necessary" to "closely related and directly
essential" as a limitation upon the "fringe area" under the production clause. 29
C.F.R. § 776.17(a) (1958) (The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of
the U.S. Department of Labor has accepted this legislative history to the effect
that the 1949 amendment is intended to narrow the scope of coverage under the
"engaged in production of goods for commerce" clause.) See 95 Cong. Rec. 14880(1949) (remarks of Senator Taft). 95 Cong. Rec. 11001 (1949) (remarks of Con-
gressman Lucas).
1 Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 262 F.2d 359(6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959).
Summers, Admission Policies of Labor Unions, 61 Q.J. Ecox. 66-107 (1946).
See generally, NORTHRUP, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE NEGRO (2d ed. 1944). As
one of its "Objects and Principles," the AFL-CIO in its constitution undertakes
"to encourage all workers without regard to race, creed, or color or national origin
to share in the full benefits of union organization." AFL-CIO CoNsT. art. II, § 4.
This provision was criticized on the grounds that it did not recognize the right
of all persons to "full membershp" in trade unions. HANDBOOK OF UNION GovERN-
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